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It was the Chinese over 3000 years ago, not the Americans in this century, who 
first used large-scale psychological testing (Dubois, 1966). But, as with many 
other technological developments, it was the United States that enthusiastically 
adopted the method (Haney, 1981). By now it is highly probable that every 
person in our country has been affected in some way by the administration of 
tests. Testing has become the means by which major decisions about people's 
lives are made in industry, education, hospitals, mental health clinics, and the 
civil service. 
Tests themselves, by and large, are facially neutral. They do not inherently 
discriminate against those who take them and, undoubtedly, scores derived from 
tests have been used to admit, advance, and employ. For most people, however, 
test results have served as exclusionary mechanisms- to segregate, institutional-
ize , track, and deny access to coveted and increasingly scarce employment 
opportunities . 
At one time, the work of academic and applied psychometricians went vir-
tually unexamined by the law, but as the use of tests increased in the United 
States, so did their potential for causing legally cognizable injury to test takers . 
As a resu lt , there is probably no current activity performed by psychologists so 
closely scrutinized and regulated by the legal system as testing . 
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SOCIAL INFLUENCES 
Although recent lig itation and legislation directly affect the continued admin-
istration of psychological testing, most especiall y in employment and educa-
tional settings, it is my contention that what appears to be an antitesting move-
ment in the courts and in Congress is not an anti testing movement at all. It is my 
thesis that , in the main , the law 's concern about testing has been evoked by the 
following three major social developments. 
I. Our society in the las t 30 years has made attempts, albeit unevenly , to 
undo the effects of history of de jure segregation and discrimination against 
racial and ethnic minorities. Many of the more familiar cases, such as Larry P. 
v. Riles (1979) affecting individual intelligence scales, Debra P. v. Turlington 
(1981) t concerning minimal competency tests, and Teal v. Connecticut (1982) 
litigating nuances of employment selection assessment, flow inexorably from 
Brown v. Education (1954) and are simply renewed claims by minorities for the 
fulfillment of the meaning of the 14th Amendment 's equal protection clause. 
They refl ect the most recent challenges to practices that are perceived as attempts 
to continue, in a more sophisticated manner, the racial and ethnic separation 
more blatantly used in the early 1950s and 1960s by educational institutions and 
public and private employers . 
2. The courts have recognized , as a constitutional imperative, the right 
against impermissible intrusion by the government into the private li ves of its 
citizens. Defining the right to privacy has been di fficult for the courts, but 
recently the Supreme Court noted that one aspect of the right " is the individual 
interest in avoiding di sclosure of personal matters [Whalen v. Roe, 1977 , p. 
598]" or as the late Justice Brandeis more esthetically phrased it , " the right to be 
let alone [Olmstead v. United States, 1927, p. 478]." If, as Reubhausen and 
Brim ( 1965) assert , the' 'essence of privacy is . .. the freedom of the individual 
to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which , and most 
importantly , the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opinions are 
to be shared with or withheld from others [pp. I 189- 11 90]," one can eas il y see 
why the broad spectrum of testing, but particularly personality and attitude 
testing , wou ld be the object of legal scrutiny. 
3. Finally, there has been a third soc ial development that has influenced the 
law's concern with testing. Unlike judicial declarations concerning di scrimina-
tion and privacy, this last influence is not of recent vintage . As a soc ial phe-
nomenon it has been part of human culture since its beginning. If you will pardon 
a highly technical psycholegal term, I would like to call this third aspect stu-
pidity. Stupidity may be defined as negligence or, alternatively, the fa ilure to use 
reasonable care in carrying out one's obligations. Although it does not connote 
IComplete c itations for a ll cases referenced in the tex t are found in Table 5. 1. 
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intentional or willful desire to harm, negligent harm can be just as damaging as 
purposefully inflicted injury. It is my thesis that stupidity , more than modern 
interpretations of equal protection and privacy , has been responsible for the 
increased legal regulation of psychological testing. On this count, both psychol-
ogists and judges must be faulted. 
I believe that almost all the important legal decisions concerning psychologi-
cal testing may be viewed as various combinations of the social phenomena 
identified as items 1 to 3 just given. I would like to spend some time in develop-
ing this thesis by giving several pertinent examples from educational , em-
ployment , and forensic settings . 
SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON LEGAL DECISIONS: SOME 
EXAMPLES 
Education 
The Supreme Court's ringing declarations in Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954) ended state-imposed segregation in the public schools. But in the decade 
after Brown, many southern school systems refused to accept the Court ' s deci-
sion as final. They interpreted the Court's assertion that separation of black 
children from white "solely because of their race generates a feeling of in-
feriority ... that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone [po 494]" as an empirically testable hypothesis , not a normative legal 
principle . Thus, in the early 1960s one of Georgia's school systems sought to 
disprove what it believed to be an erroneous factual premise . It alleged the seg-
regation they were accused of perpetuating was not based on color "but rather 
upon racial traits of educational significance as to which racial identity was only 
a convenient index [Stell v. Savannah- Chatham County Board of Education, 
1963, p. 668]." They attempted to show that differences in learning rates , 
cognitive ability, behavioral traits, and capacity for education in general were so 
great that not only was it impossible for black children and white children to be 
educated effectively in the same room but that to "congregate children of such 
diverse traits in schools . . . would seriously impair the educational oppor-
tunities of both white and Negro and cause them grave psychological harm [po 
668]. " 
To prove their contentions the defendants called several expert witnesses, 
among them two psychologists, Travis Osborne and Henry Garrett. Based on 
such instruments as the California Achievement Test and the California Mental 
Maturity Tests, they testified that significant differences in test scores were 
indicative of inherent differences in the races and that only minor changes could 
be achieved by educational readjustment or other environmental change. AI-
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TABLE 5.1 
Table of Cases 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody , 422 U.S. 405 (1 975). 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
Baltie v. Estelle, No . 79- 1567 (5 th Cir. Sept. 11 , 198 1). 
Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483 (1 954). 
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5 th Cir. 198 1). 
Estelle v . Smith , 45 1 U.S. 454 (1 98 1). 
Firefighters Institute v. City of St. Louis, 6 16 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. 
United States v. City of St. Louis, 452 U.S. 938 (1 98 1). 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 10 13 (D.C. Cir. 1923) . 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40 1 U.S. 424 (1971 ). 
Guardians Assoc iation v. New York Civil Service Commission , 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980) , 
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 939 ( 198 1). 
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp . 40 1 (D . D.C. 1967) afj'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
Kirk land ' v. New York State Dep' t. of Correctional Services 520 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied. 429 U.S. 823 (1 976). 
Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979) appeal docketed. No. 80-4027 (9th Cir. , 
Jan. 17 , 1980). 
Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E .D. Pa. 1973). 
Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S . 439 ( 1928). 
PASE v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 83 1 (N .D. III . 1980). 
Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Board of Educat ion, 200 F. Supp . 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963) , rev' d 333 
F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S . 933 (1 964). 
Teal v. Connecticut , U.S . , 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982). 
Wash ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
Whalen v. Roe , 429 U.S. 589 (1977) . 
though these test results and testimonies went unchallenged by attorneys fi ghting 
to enforce desegregation, the idea that such devices could measure innate ability 
found its way into a 1967 decision that , at the time, became the most persuasive 
and widely quoted legal opinion of its kind . That case is Hobson v. Hansen. 
At issue in Hobson was not psychological testing but rather the constitu-
tionality of disparities in the allocation of financial and educational resources in 
the Washington, D.C., public school system that , it was claimed, favored white 
children. Also at issue was the overrepresentation of black children in lower, and 
white children in upper, ability groups. But, in the course of the tri al, it was 
adduced that the method by which track assignments were made depended al-
most entirely on such standardized group ability scales as the Metropolitan 
Readiness and Achievement Test and the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability 
Test. Hobson, when read in its entirety, represents the justi fied condemnation of 
rigid , poorly conceived classification practices that negatively affected the edu-
cational opportunities of minority children and led to permanent stigmatization of 
blacks as unteachable . But swept within Hobson' s condemnation of harmful 
classification practices were ability tests used as the sole or primary decision-
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making dev ices to justify placement. Not only was ability grouping as then 
practiced in the District of Columbia abolished , but tests were banned unless they 
could be shown to measure children's innate capacity to learn . No psychologist 
who has written on the subject, including Jensen (1969 , 1980) , believes that tests 
solely measure hereditary endowment (Anastasi, 1976; Cleary, Humphreys, 
Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975). No test could pass such a criterion . 
Left unscathed in Hobson were the stately, revered, and venerated devices 
against which all other tests were measured- the individual intelligence scales. 
But that was soon to change as the result of actions brought in San Francisco and 
Chicago. Two diametrically opposed decisions, Larry P. v. Riles (1979) (the San 
Francisco case) and PASE v. Hannon (1980) (the Chicago case) are seen by 
psychologists as attacks on IQ tests. That, however, is a significant mispercep-
tion . Like Hobson, these two pieces of litigation are actually challenges to 
educational practices deemed to be discriminatory . [Similarly , the recent attack 
on minimal competency tests, see Debra P . v. Turlington (1981), is more appro-
priately seen as a claim by black children that the use of such tests is merely a 
subtle but effective effort by states to resegregate the public schools .] 
The real issue was the basis for di sproportional placement of black children in 
segregated, self-contained classes for the educably mentally retarded. Through-
out his opinion , Judge Peckham in Larry P. v. Riles [hereafter Riles] labeled the 
EMR program "dead-end," " isolating," " inferior," and "stigmatizing." Re-
lying on the testimony of state employees or printed material from the state 
department of education, the court concluded California's EMR classes were 
"designed to separate out children who are incapable of learning in regular 
classes [Riles, 1979, p. 941]" and were not meant to provide remedial instruc-
tion so that children could learn the sk ills necessary for eventual return to regular 
instruction. Given these characteristics , the court considered "the decision to 
place children in these classes . .. a crucial one. Children wrongly placed in 
these classes are unlikely to escape as they inevitably lag farther and farther 
behind the children in regular classes [po 942]." And, as in Hobson, the primary 
bas is for these decisions were found to be tests- most often the WISC-R and the 
Stanford-Binet. 
Interpreting the nondiscriminatory provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (Pub. L. 
94-142), particularly regulations requiring that assessment instruments be "vali -
dated for the specific purpose for which they are used [35 C.F.R. §104.35; 34 
C.F.R. §300 .532]," Judge Peckham found the challenged tests unable to meet 
that requirement. The tests, the court ruled, would have to be shown valid for 
selecting children who belonged in substandard , segregated educational anachro-
ni sms (otherwise known as EMR classes). And because that kind of validation 
had not been done, the court permanently prohibited California "from utili zing, 
permitting the use of, or approving the use of any standardized tests .. . for the 
identification of black EMR children or their placement into EMR classes [po 
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989]" without first securing the court's approva l. Even Judge Grady, who in 
PASE v. Hannon ( 1980) upheld the use of individual intelligence tests in a 
similar challenge concluded that inappropriate placement in an EMR class was 
an educational tragedy that was li kely to be totally harmful. 
Emp loyment 
Similar phenomena as I have described in public schools occurred in em-
ployment settings. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), which introduced the 
concept of " job-relatedness" into the law of employment testing and created a 
morass not yet fully resolved, wou ld never have been decided if the defendants 
had not had a history of racial discrimination. Prior to 1965, the Duke Power Co. 
openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring and assigning of em-
ployees at its Dan River plant. Blacks were employed only in the lowest level 
jobs and at the lowest rate of pay. In 1964 Congress passed Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin . On July 2, 1965, the date on which Title VII took 
effect, Duke Power decided to no longer restrict blacks to the lowest level 
positions. However, at the same time, it instituted a policy that, to qualify for 
placement in higher leve l positions, employees would have to achieve sati sfacto-
ry scores on the Wonderlic Personnel Test, purportedly an intelligence measure, 
and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Blacks challenged the tests, 
claiming that neither instrument was directed or intended to measure the ability 
to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs. A unanimous Supreme 
Court faulted the company for using "broad and general testing devices [p o 
433]" and reminded the defendants that although the use of tests was permissible 
under Title VII, they had to "fairly measure the knowledge or sk ills required by 
the particular job [po 433]." 
Simi larly, accusations of purposeful discrimination in both the private and 
public sector has stimu lated litigation in such cases as Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody (1975) and Firefighters Institute v. City of St. Louis ( 1980). The result 
has been increasingly sophisticated challenges to professionally developed tests 
even in situations where purposeful discrimination is not an issue [e.g., Guard-
ian Association of New York City v. Civil Service Commission (1980); Teal v. 
Connecticut (1982)]. Like educational tests, "employment tests are being sub-
jected to a degree of governmental scrutiny that very few human contrivances 
could bear [Wigdor, 1982, p. 67]. " 
Privacy 
Although discrimination has evoked judicial scrutiny of ability tests, the concern 
for the right to privacy has stimulated similar examination of personality tests. If 
stupidity has ever fostered a judicial decision concern ing testing, there is no 
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better example than Merriken v. Cressman (1973) . The case had its origins in 
1970 when a survey, ordered by the Commiss ion of Montgomery County , Penn-
sylvania and conducted by a company called Scientific Resources , revealed that 
many children in the county were heavily involved with drugs. Most of the 
children who used drugs, the study claimed, possessed some common charac-
teristics. For example, one finding indicated that 80% of the identified drug 
abusers felt estranged from their families . On the bas is of such data, Scientific 
Resources proposed that the County Drug Commission sponsor a drug preven-
tion program, later labeled CPI, for the Critical Period of Intervention. All three 
of the county school districts agreed to participate in the program. 
There were two phases to the study: identification and remediation. In the first 
phase, tests were given to eighth-grade students and their teachers so that certain 
students, deemed potential drug abusers , could become part of the remediation 
program. The teachers were asked to identify pupils who most and least fit eight 
descriptions of antisocial behavior (e.g . , "This pupil makes unusual or inap-
propriate responses during normal school activity"). The student form was to be 
somewhat lengthier. First , students would be asked to assess their own behavior , 
that is, to state which of the following statements was most like themselves: (1) 
someone who will probably be a success in life; (2) one who gets upset when 
faced with a difficult school problem; (3) someone who has lots of se lf-confi-
dence; and (4) a student who has more problems than other students . In the next 
part of the scale they would be asked questions about their relationships with 
their parents and the behavior of their parents (e.g. , to indicate whether one or 
both parents "tell me how much they love me" or "make me feel unloved" or 
"seem to regret that I am growing up and spending more time away from 
home"). Finally , the students would select from their classmates those who fit 
certain descriptive statements similar in kind to the ones given the teachers. 
The second phase of the study was intervention. When the CPI staff had 
analyzed all the results , they would compi le a li st of chi ldren who would have 
significant potential for becoming drug abusers. This li st would then be given to 
the school superintendent who would organize a joint effort among guidance 
counselors, teachers, school psychologists, and others to provide group 
therapeutic experiences to which the identified students would be involuntarily 
assigned. 
When the program was first developed the school system did not intend to 
obtain the affirmative consent of the parents for their children to participate. 
They did plan to send a letter home to each parent , as follows: 
Dear Parent: 
This letter is to inform you that, this fall , we are initiating a Drug Program 
called "Critical Period of Intervention" (CPl). The aim of thi s program is to 
identify children who may be susceptible to drug abuse and to intervene with 
concrete measures to help these children. Diagnostic testing will be part of this 
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program and will provide data enabling the prevention program to be specific and 
positive. 
We ask your support and cooperation in this program and assure you of the 
confidentiality of these studies. If you wish to examine or receive further informa-
tion regard ing the program, please feel free to contact the school. If you do not 
wish to participate in this program, please notify your principal of this decision. We 
will assume your cooperation unless otherwise notified by you [Merriken v. Cress-
man, 1973 , p. 917). 
Also, as originally proposed, the study contained no provision for student 
consent. 
Sylvia Merriken, the mother of one of the intended participants in the study, 
who happened to be a therapist in a drug and alcoholic rehabilitation center, 
complained to the principal of the school where her son was enrolled and to the 
school board. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) then announced it 
would represent Mrs. Merriken in an attempt to enjoin the school permanently 
from carrying out its plans. The ACLU began by fi ling a complaint in federal 
district court claiming that the program would violate the constitutional rights of 
both Mrs. Merriken and her son. It quickly obtained a temporary injunction 
prohibiting the county from implementing its proposal until the litigation was 
completed. At that point , two of the three schools in Montgomery County decid-
ed to discontinue their participation but the Norristown system, where Mrs. 
Merriken's son attended, persisted, although it honored the temporary in-
junction. 
When the suit itself began, the school system offered to change the format of 
their letter to include parental consent. In another attempt at compromise, the 
school modified the test so that students who did not want to be included could 
return an uncompleted protocol. But the proposal contained no provision for 
student consent and no data were to be provided whereby students could make an 
informed choice about participating. 
Of the many constitutional challenges Mrs . Merriken made , the court enter-
tained only one of them seriously- the right of privacy. The court found that the 
highly personal nature of the instrument disrupted family associations and inter-
fered with the right of the mother to rear her child. It said, "There is probably no 
more private a relationship , excepting marriage, which the Constitution safe-
guards than that between parent and child. This Court can look upon any inva-
sion of that relationship as a direct violation of one's Constitutional right to 
privacy [p . 918] ." And although there was no precedent to the effect in the 
Supreme Court, the district court declared that privacy was entitled to as much 
constitutional protection as free speech . 
Although the court failed to analyze the privacy rights of her son (but see 
Bersoff, 1983), the court found that Mrs . Merriken was unable to give genuinely 
informed consent to the invasion of her personal life because the parental permis-
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sion letter was so inadequate. The court deridingly compared the letter to a Book-
of- the-Month Club solicitation in which parents' silence would be construed as 
acquiescence. The letter was also criticized as a selling device in which parents 
were convinced to allow children to participate. It was not , as it properly should 
be, an objective document telling parents of the potentially negative feature and 
dangerous aspects of the program. 
There were other problems with the program. The promotional letter prom-
ised confidentiality, but the program contemplated the development of a " mas-
sive data bank" and the dissemination of data relating to specific, identifiable 
students to school superintendents, principals, guidance counselors, coaches, 
social workers, PTA members, and school board members. And even if the 
school system had been more circumspect and had constructed means by which 
the data were less widely distributed (or not distributed at all) , no promise of 
confidentiality could take precedence over a subpeona compelling the disclosure 
of the material to law enforcement officers. As the court warned: 
(T)here is no assurance that should an enterprising di strict attorney convene a 
special grand jury to investigate the drug program in Montgomery County, the 
records of the cpr Program would remain inviolate from subpoenas and that he 
could not determine the identity of children who have been labeled by the CPI 
Program as potential drug abusers lp. 9 16) . 
Parents were not at all in formed of this possibility. 
Compounding the other problems was the fact that the identification instru-
ments did not possess enough psychometric soundness to overcome the hazards 
that may have fl owed from their use. Although there could have been consider-
able harm done to children correctly identi fied , the court was particularly con-
cerned about those children incorrectly identi fied . In a statement that should rai se 
the anxiety level of psychologists, it said , "When a program talks about labeling 
someone as a particular type and such a label could remain with him for the 
remainder of his life, the margin of error must be almost nil [p o 920] ." 
Forensics 
Ironicall y, the one use of tests that has remained relatively uncriticized is in 
forensic assessment. Ability tests used in educational and employment decision 
making, despite their myriad problems, have been subjected to decades of em-
pi rical analysis and validation. Yet , they have undergone the most scathing 
review by the legal system. On the other hand , based on personality and projec-
tive instruments, forensic psychologists since the 1940s have routinely testi fied 
in cases involving competency to stand trial, insanity , civil commitment , the 
causal connection between negligent conduct and emotional and physical injury, 
child custody, and the eligibility of criminal defendants for the death penalty. 
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Whereas such determinations are at least as cruc ial to the interests of the test 
taker and society, personality and projective instruments have escaped wholesale 
scrutiny by the courts and remain largely untouched. 
As long as psychologists possess the requisite indices of expertise such as 
proper education, training, experience, scholarly publications, and professional 
affi liation, they are permitted to offer opinions on the kinds of ultimate issues I 
have just cataloged based on the administration of tests like the Rorschach, 
MMPI, and TAT. Although such testimony has subjected individual psychol -
ogists to harsh cross-examinations (Ziskin, 198 1) , the courts have never se-
riously questioned whether these tests are sufficiently precise to evoke probative 
expert testimony or to support valid opinions that will be more helpful than 
testimony of the thoughtful layperson to the jury . 
The confused approach to expert testimony by psychologists is , in part, ex-
plained by a failure to recognize that it is not a unidimensional concept but, 
rather , involves three levels of inference. The first level consists of the psychol-
ogist's personal observation of the client made during the course of the clinical 
evaluation, including essentially objective data about the individual's behavior 
and the uninterpreted results of psychological testing. The second level moves 
from reporting observations to the synthesis of data to form a diagnosis that will 
classify, and perhaps account for, the behavior manifested during the course of 
the evaluation or at the time of the event in question. It is on thi s level that 
psychologists make a judgment about whether the person has a mental disorder. 
Whether the diagnosis is presented in terms of a particular label or a lengthy 
description of personality , the critical element is that the diagnosis derives its 
value from the psychometric soundness of the assessment devices used . The third 
level concerns an opinion about the ultimate issue (i .e., child custody, or in-
sanity) that the jury or judge must resolve. Whereas I have significant reserva-
tions about any testimony by experts as to level three (Comment, 1978; Gass & 
Bersoff, submitted for publication) , it is concern about testimony at level two 
that is most relevant to this chapter. 
The test for the admissib ility of scientific evidence was developed 60 years 
ago in Frye v. United States (1923), which limited such evidence to that which 
has gained "general sc ientific acceptance." Under its modern interpretation by 
subsequent tribunals, the courts require not only acceptance within the scientific 
community but also accuracy. Thus , assessment devices used in the forensic 
arena should not only have gained acceptance within psychology but, more 
importantly , the accuracy of the technique should be demonstrated to yield 
information that is more likely to be true than could be gleaned from lay testi-
mony. Resu lts from polygraphs and voice spectrography have been denied ad-
missibility because the error rate is considered to be 10 to 25%. If such a criterion 
were applied to most clinicians' favorite projective devices , none of the informa-
tion or diagnostic conclusions derived from them would be admitted in court . 
Validity coefficients that clinicians might find highly acceptable may not pass 
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legal muster, Tests' vulnerability to situational and experimenter effects and to 
such phenomena as illusory correlations (Chapman & Chapman, 1969) have 
been well documented (Comment, 1978; Monahan, 1981). 
The scientific literature regarding reliability and validity of tests used by 
forensic experts suggests that, at best , they are highly suspect and susceptible to 
a variety of significant sources of psychometric and interpretive error. They have 
limited psychometric soundness even in the hands of the most skilled clinicians , 
and there is little basis to assert that expert opinions , based on projective tests, 
are more accurate than layperson's opinions, But, although forensic psychol-
ogists may have little empirically based expertise to offer the legal system, they 
are uniformly permitted to testify and their judgments often CatTY great weight 
with the jury. On the other hand , the work of educational and industrial psychol-
ogists undergo close review, even though there is greater reason to believe that 
the instruments upon which they rely are more demonstrably accurate. Why? The 
answer is partly rooted in tradition- such issues as insanity have confronted the 
courts for decades; issues such as proper placement in special education pro-
grams or promotion to fire captains have not. But, more importantly, the tests 
used in forensic settings do not impinge on privacy or disproportionately affect 
racial or ethnic minorities. It is interesting to note, however, that recently foren -
sic examinations used in criminal settings have raised concerns about the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel (see Estelle v. Smith, 1981 , 
and Bclltie v. Estelle, 1981), 
SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE AND THE COURTS 
All of these conflicting perceptions about psychological tests raise a final issue 
with which I wish to conclude- that of the relationship between the social 
sciences and the courts, If that relationship were to be examined by a psycho-
analyst, the analyst would no doubt conclude that it is a highly neurotic, conflict-
ridden ambivalent affair (I stress "affair" because it is certainly no marriage). 
Thirty years ago the vitality of data generated by psychologists seemed assured 
when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) conspicuously 
referred to studies by Kenneth and Mamie Clark concerning the effect of segre-
gation on black children. The reference to those studies in a now famous footnote 
created a controversy that still exists concerning their relevance and validity 
(Cahn, 1955 ; Clark, 1980; Kluger, 1975; Levin, 1978). Despite that controversy 
there is little doubt that Brown represents the most dramatic use of social science 
scholarship. 
But if Brown produced optimism, subsequent events did not uniformly rein-
force those buoyant feelings. In the past 5 years the Supreme Court has rejected 
empirical data in cases concerning sex discrimination, the death penalty , and 
corporal punishment. Perhaps most clearly exemplary of the Court's am-
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bivalence is its decision in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) where it unanimously 
agreed that criminal trials before five-member juries unconstitutionally deprived 
defendants of the right to trial by jury. Justice Blackmun announced the judg-
ment of the Supreme Court and in his decision relied heavily on the work of 
social psychologists and others to support the conclusion that less than six-person 
panels substantially and negatively altered the jury process. However, only one 
other justice joined that opinion. Three justices were particularly critical of his 
use of social science data. In a concurring opinion (indicating agreement with the 
outcome but not the reasoning of the primary opinion) Justice Powell, joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, acerbically noted his "reservations 
as to the wisdom ... of Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology 
derived from statistical studies [po 246]." 
The same love- hate relationship finds its way into lower-court opinions con-
cerning testing. These opinions, regardless of whether one likes the result, are 
generally devoid of sound psychometric reasoning. Even if the conclusions are 
correct, the courts often fail to cite the relevant literature in a way that convinces 
the reader that the conclusion is empirically supportable. 
Social Science in Education and Employment Cases 
Education. We can once again return to the education and employment 
testing cases for the most pertinent examples . As you may recall, the court in 
Riles permanently prohibited the state from using any standardized intelligence 
tests for the identification of black chi ldren for placement into EMR classes and 
held that before the state could use IQ tests, it would have to meet the following 
standards: 
1. Tests would have to yield the same pattern of scores when administered to 
different groups of students. 
2. Tests would have to yield approximately equal means for all subgroups 
included in the standardization sample. 
3. Tests would have to be correlated with relevant criterion measures, that is, 
lQ scores of black children with classroom performance. 
The implication in Riles that an unbiased test must yield the same pattern of 
scores when administered to different groups of people is psychometrically un-
sound . It is generally , though not uniformly, conceded that tests are fair when 
they predict with equal accuracy, not with equal results, for all groups. If that 
position is correct, then the court's definition "eliminates a priori any possibility 
of real group differences on various psychological traits [Schmidt & Hunter, 
1974, p. I] . " The court rejected the possibility of genuine inferiority and social-
class differences . Though the court rested its decision on the finding that the tests 
were culturally biased, it provided little hard data to support such a conclusion 
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and was tentative in discussing it. In fact , the court 's empirical support for its 
conclusions consumed only I of 70 printed pages. Moreover, the court's deter-
mination that the tests contain questions biased against poor black children is not 
uniformly accepted , and there are some data to suggest that whatever discrimina-
tion there is in tests, lower scores in blacks are not totall y the resul t of content 
bias. 
By definition , achievement and intelligence tests will always fail to meet the 
demand for assessment devices devoid of environmental influence. Given what 
they purport to measure, they inev itably refl ect the social setting of the test taker: 
" [All] behavior is ... affected by the cultural milieu in which the individual is 
reared and since psychological tests are but samples of behavior, cultural influ-
ences will and should be refl ected in test performance . It is therefore futile to try 
to devise a test that is free from cultural influences [Anastasi, 1976, p. 345]." 
Efforts to produce culture-free tests or to reduce content bias have met with 
little success. " Nonverbal or performance tests are now generally recognized as 
fa lling short of the goal of freedom fro m cultural influences, and attempts to 
develop culture fair verbal tests ... are recognized as failu res [Reschl y, 1979, 
p. 23 1] ." More spec ifically, Anastasi (1 976) states: "On the WISC , for in-
stance, black children usuall y fi nd the Performance Tests as difficult or more 
di fficult than the Verbal Tests; this pattern is also characteris tic of children fro m 
low socioeconomic levels [p o 348]. " Kirp (1 973) concludes: " [It] is sobering 
but instructi ve to recognize that minority children do poorly even on so-called 
culture-free tests [p o 758]." 
There has been relati vely little research on content bias itself , particularly 
with regard to individual intelligence tests. What has been found with regard to 
standardized tests generally (Flaugher, 1978; Green, 1978), or individual intel-
ligence tests specificall y (Reynolds, 1982; Reschly , 1980; Sandoval, 1979) , does 
not support Judge Peckham' s conclusions. For example , contrary to popular 
thought , such widely criticized questions on the WISC-R comprehension subtest 
as, " What is the thing to do if a boy (girl) much smaller than yourself starts a 
fight with you?" (a question that even Judge Grady in PASE found biased) may 
actually be easier for black children than they are for white (Reschly, 1979). 
Eliminating 13 items perceived to be biased from a widely used 82-item elemen-
tary reading test " did not improve the performance of schools with high-minor-
ity populations relative to their performance on the original ' biased vers ion ' 
[Flaugher, 1978, p. 675]." Deleting what appear to be idiosyncratic items from 
group ability tests resul ts only in " making the tests considerably more difficul t 
for everyone, since many of the items [exhibiting] the widest discrepancy be-
tween groups [are] moderate to low in overall difficulty [Flaugher , 1978 , p. 
675]" (but see Oakland & Matuszek, 1977) . Most pertinently, Sandoval ( 1979) 
found no evidence of items bias on the WISC-R: "The notion that there may be a 
number of items with radically different di fficulties for children from different 
ethnic groups has not been supported [po 925]." Moreover , the interjudge agree-
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ment concerning cultural bias on the WISC-R appears very low (see Reschly 
citing Sandoval, 1980). 
Although Judge Peckham can be faulted for his analysis of cultural discrimi-
nation in intelligence tests and for implying that the issue is more settled than it 
is, any criticism of his analysis does not imply that his conclusion is incorrect or 
that there is support for such alternative hypotheses as genetics- rejected by all 
parties in Riles and PASE--Dr socioeconomic explanations. In any event, the 
court in Riles was correct in criticizing test publishers for not adequately standar-
dizing . and validating their instruments on discrete minority populations . The 
court could only rest its holding on the data presented to it by the parties. The 
state's defense was made difficult by the lack of relevant studies on differential 
validity, the absence of systematic research concerning content bias, and Califor-
nia's concession that cultural differences affected IQ scores . 
If Judge Peckham's analysis of the issue of cultural bias was scanty and 
fau lty , Judge Grady in PASE v. Hannon (1980) can best be described as naive. 
At worst it was unintelligent, and completely devoid of empirical content. Dis-
trustful of the expert testimony in the case, he felt it imperative to examine the 
tests themselves so he could judge whether the claim of cultural bias could be 
sustained. Thus, in a startling and extraordinary manner , he proceeded to cite 
each question on the Wechsler and Binet scales in an attempt to determine which, 
in his estimation, were culturally biased. The result of this analysis was the 
judgment that only eight items on the WISC/WISC-R and one item on the 
Stanford- Binet were suspect or actually biased . At bottom, what it represented 
was a single person's subjective and personal judgment cloaked in the apparent 
authority of judicial robes. If submitted as a study to one of psychology's more 
respected refereed journals, rather than masquerading as a legal opinion , it would 
have been summarily rejected as an experiment whose sample size and lack of 
objectivity stamped it as unworthy of publication. The court's opinion in PASE 
amply supports Reschly's (1980) conclusion that with regard to item bias on the 
individually administered intelligence tests, "subjective judgments appear to be 
unreliable and invalid in terms of empirical analysis .... The only data confirm-
ing test bias that exists now is judgmental and speculative [p o 127]." 
What makes Judge Grady's opinion interesting, if not precedent setting, is the 
fact the decision contains the questions and correct answers to every item on the 
WISC, the WISC-R, and the Stanford- Binet. McClelland (1973) suggested 
several years ago that tests should be given away. Whether inadvertent ly or 
purposely, Judge Grady has done just that. Those who wish to destroy the 
usefulness of these tests need only inform parents and anti test advocates of the 
existence of the decision and its citation to the proper volume in the series of 
legal reports that publishes verbatim all federal district court opinions . Although 
Judge Grady eventually upheld the tests as valid, his decision , to a far greater 
extent than Judge Peckham's decision in Riles, may have the effect of invalidat-
ing the tests as they are presently used. The Psychological Corporation, publisher 
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of the Wechsler Scales (and the System of Multi-Pluralistic Assessment 
[SOMPA] that uses these scales), tried unsuccessfully to convince Judge Grady 
to seal that part of his decision containing the questions and answers to the scales 
so that their content would not be published and thus made public. It has since 
issued a statement attempting to protect its copyright in the tests and threatens 
legal action if it is not protected: "The Psychological Corporation considers 
unauthorized reproduction of its copyrighted material from any source, including 
a court' s opinion , to be an invasion of its rights, including its copyright , and the 
right to maintain the necessary security of its tests [Udell , 1980] ." As of this 
writing , there has not been specific legal action against those who have informed 
general audiences of its existence . But one potential outcome of the decision is 
that the security of these tests may have, indeed, been seriously compromised, if 
not destroyed. 
Employment. The situation with regard to employment testing does not 
evoke any greater confidence. There are sharp differences among the federal 
courts, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and psychometric 
experts as to the proper conceptualization of test validation within the industrial 
setting. Novick (1 98 1) has perceptively summari zed the struggle: 
Individual federal agencies have responsibilities and goals de legated by the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government , monitored by the judicial branch, and 
ultimately spec ified by the incumbent agency management. Although these agen-
c ies share concern for benefits to soc iety as a whole, they tend to focus attention on 
their own particular mandates, and for this reason they often view testing and other 
issues quite differently . In fac t, it is not uncommon for government agencies to be 
on opposite sides in litigation involving tests, for employers to receive conflicting 
directives from different government agenc ies, and fo r employees to find that the ir 
tes t scores are considered in light of widely varying objectives by employers and 
government agency representatives [p. 1035]. 
The Supreme Court has been particularly unhelpful in sorting out this confu-
sion . For example , in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1 971) a unanimous court 
stated that the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing were "entitled to great 
deference" (p . 434). Four years later, Chief Justice Burger, who had written the 
dec ision in Griggs now complained in a minority opinion in Albermarle Paper 
Co . v. Moody (1 975) about the Court' s "slavish adherence" (p . 452) to those 
same Guidelines. Perhaps in a more important example, one I described at some 
length in a recent American Psychologist article (Bersoff, 1981) , the Court has 
badly muddled the whole issue of test validation. In Washington v. Davis (1976) 
in support of its opinion that validation could be accomplished in "anyone of 
several ways," the Court cited the then extant version of the Standards fo r 
Educational and Psychological Tests (APA, AERA, NCME, 1974) to the effect 
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that there were " three basic methods of validation: 'empirical' or 'criterion ' 
validity . . . 'construct validity ' ... and 'content' validity [Washington v. 
Davis, 1976, p . 247 , fn . 13] ." 
Many industrial and academic psychologists (Guion , 1980; Messick, 1980; 
Tenopyr, 1977) contend that insofar as the courts have interpreted the test stan-
dards and the EEOC Guidelines (superseded now by the Uni form Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures, see EEOC et aI. , 1978) and its implementing 
" Question and Answers" (EEOC et aI. , 1979) to mean that content , criterion, 
and construct validity are distinct forms of validation , those interpretations are 
oversimplified , if not erroneous . The Uniform Guidelines , according to thi s 
view, inappropriately treat three aspects of validity as "something of a holy 
trinity representing three different roads to psychometric salvation [Guion , 1980 , 
p. 386]" rather than viewing them as subsets within the uni fyi ng and common 
framework of construct validity. Most judicial opinions, with one or two con-
spicuous exceptions (see Guardians Association of New York City v. Civil Ser-
vice Commission, 1980) , concerned with the controversy over content versus 
criterion versus construct validity in employment tests also view the three as 
separable entities rather than on a continum and fail to cite or even recognize the 
work of psychologists who have urged a more sophisticated approach to valida-
tion analys is. It has been suggested that the term construct-ref erenced validity 
(Mess ick, 1975) would more prec isely encompass almost all di screte and spe-
ciali zed validation terms, integrating content relevance and content coverage as 
well as predictive and diagnostic utility. "The bridge or unifying theme that 
permits this integration is the meaningfulness of interpretability of the test 
scores, which is the goal of the construct validation process [Messick, 1980 , p. 
101 5]. " 
In 1982, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the EEOC Guide-
lines and its implementing Questions and Answers in Teal v. Connecticut ( 1982) 
but carefully avoided the issue. In that case, the plaintiffs are four black provi-
sional state employees who , when they sought to attain permanent status in their 
jobs as Welfare Eligibility Supervisors, were obliged to participate in a selection 
process requiring a passing score on a written tes~. Those who passed the test 
became part of an eligibility pool from which the state would select successful 
applicants. The final determinations were made on the basis of a number of 
nontest criteri a (e.g., past work , recommendation) . 
All the plaintiffs fa iled to achieve the cutoff score of 65 on the test which 
would have made them eligible for further consideration. As a whole, the pass ing 
rate for blacks was 68% of that of whites. The unsuccessful plaintiffs then 
instituted a suit claiming that the state's use of the test violated Title VII . 
However, a month prior to tri al, the state made its final selection , the result of 
which was that 23% of the eligible blacks and 13.5% of the eligible whites were 
promoted to supervisor. The actual promotion rate of blacks, therefore, was 
169.5% of the actual promotion rate of whites . Thus, whereas the end result of 
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the state's selection process (the so-called " bottom line") was nondiscriminato-
ry to blacks as a class, the threshold testing component did not meet the Uniform 
Guidelines "four-fifths" rule, which provides that a "selection rate for any race, 
sex, or ethnic group which is less than [80%] of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded ... as evidence of adverse impact [29 
C.F.R. §1607.4(c)]." 
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, hoi ding that they 
failed to prove a prima facie case of di sparate impact. It asserted that although 
the ratio of the black passing rate to the white passing rate was 68%, the ratio of 
the black appointment rate to the white appointment rate was almost 170%. 
Thus, under the bottom-line approach found in the EEOC Guidelines, the plain-
tiffs ' Title VII claim has to fail. 
The plaintiffs appealed. The COUl1 of Appeals reversed the lower court , 
holding that "where a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection 
process produced disparate results and constituted a pass- fail barrier beyond 
which the complaining candidates were not permitted to proceed, a prima facie 
case of disparate impact is established , not withstanding that the entire selection 
procedure did not yield disparate results [Teal v. Connecticut, 1981, p. 135]. " 
In concluding that the district court was wrong in ruling results of the written 
examination alone were insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate 
impact, it distinguished an earlier decision by the second circuit court. In Kirkland 
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services (1975), the Court of Appeals 
held that proof concerning disparate impact of certain subtests within a larger 
examination did not constitute an unlawful discriminatory impact. But, the second 
circuit said in Kirkland, all applicants were subjected to a complete selection 
process that, when viewed as a whole, did not produce di sparate results. In Teal, 
however, the pass-fail barrier denied employment opportunity to a di sproportion-
ately large number of minorities and prevented them from proceeding to the next 
step in the selection process. Thus, the court concluded, affirmative action 
policies that may benefit minority groups as a class do not excuse employers' 
discriminatory conduct affecting specific and readily identifiable individuals. It 
held that "Title VII was designed to protect the rights of individuals" and that it 
"matters very little to the victimized individuals that their group as a whole is well 
represented in the group ofhirees [pp. 139- 140] ." 
The trial court , finding no evidence of prima facie discrimination, never 
reached the question of the test' s validity (i.e., its " job-relatedness"), even 
though it had been fully tried before the court. However , in addition to reversing 
the tri al court' s decision , the Court of Appeals remanded the case with instruc-
tions that the lower court evaluate the test itself in light of the EEOC Guidelines. 
The state of Connecticut , in June of 1981, asked the Supreme Court to review 
the second circuit' s opinion, arguing that their decision was antagonistic to that 
of other circuits who had adopted the bottom-line concept in Title VII cases . The 
state also asserted that scrutiny of testing practices in those instances where 
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hiring or promotion practices revealed no di sparate impact would redirect em-
ployers' concerns from " the overall hiring process to the testing process, and in 
that sense [the federal courts would] be restructuring business practices ." 
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case and in June 1982 it rendered its 
opinion . The Court held , in a 5-4 decision, that " the ' bottom line' does not 
preclude ... employees from establi shing a prima facie case [of employment 
di scrimination] nor does it provide [an] employer with a defense to such a case 
[Teal v. Connecticut , 1982, p. 2529]." The Court reminded employers that 
Section 703(a)(2) spoke not in terms of jobs and promotions but of limitations 
and classifications that would deprive individuals of employment opportunities . 
Thus , " when an employer uses a non-job-related barrier to deny a minority or 
woman applicant employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant 
adverse effect on minorities or women, then the applicant has been deprived of 
an employment opportunity ' because of . .. race, color , religion , sex, or na-
tional origin ' [p o 2532]." Therefore, Title VII protects individuals, not groups 
prohibiting victims of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that they have 
not been wronged simply because other persons of their race or sex were hired: 
"Every individual employee is protected against both discriminatory treatment 
and against practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation .. . " 
[po 2535] [emphasis added] ." 
As a result , the Court refused to permit employers to claim as a defense in 
disparate impact cases that di scriminatory , non-job-related tests that serve as a 
pass- fail barrier to employment opportunities are permiss ible because the tests 
did not actuall y deprive di sproportionate numbers of blacks of promotions. " it is 
clear ," the Court asserted , " that Congress never intended to give an employer 
license to discriminate against some employees on the bias of race or sex merely 
because he favorably treats other members of the employees' groups [p . 2535]. " 
The di ssenters, led by Justice Powell , speaking for the Chief Justice and 
Justices Rehnquist and O 'Connor , agreed that the aim of Title VIi was to protect 
individuals, not groups. But , they interpreted disparate impact claims to require 
proof of di scrimination to groups. The di ssenting opinion argued that prior cases 
had made it clear that di scriminatory impact claims cannot be based on how an 
individual is treated because those claims are necessarily based on whether the 
group fares less well than other groups under a policy, practice , or test. The 
di ssent warned that the majority 's holding could " force employers either to 
eliminate tests or rely on expensive, job-related , testing procedures, the validity 
of which mayor may not be sustained if challenged. For state and local govern-
mental employers with limited funds, the practical effect of today 's decision may 
well be the adoption of simple quota hiring [p o 2540] ." Moreover, it cautioned, 
substantiall y fewer minority candidates ultimately could be hired simply by 
employers integrating consideration of test results into one overall hiring deci-
sion because, by so doing, " they will be free to select only the number of 
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minority candidates proportional to their representation in the workforce [po 2540 
n.8] . " 
All these decisions reveal that the issue of test bias is complex and controver-
sial and that opinions concerning its existence are contradictory. Several models 
of test bias, particularly with regard to its effect on prediction and selection, have 
been offered (Jensen, 1980; Peterson & Novick, 1976) , none of which seem to 
have gained favor over others. As Ysseldyke (1978) recently commented: 
Several investigators have reviewed the models of test fairness and have concluded 
that there is little agreement among the several models. It is readily apparent that 
major measurement experts have been essentially unable to agree on a definition of 
a fair test, let alone identify a test that is fair for members of different groups. There 
is little agreement on the concept of nondiscriminatory assessment [po 150]. 
Definitions of test bias may not only be "widely disparate," stemming "from 
entirely different universes of discourse [Schmidt & Hunter, 1974, p. I]" but 
ethical positions regarding test bias may be "irreconcilable [Hunter & Schmidt, 
1976, p. 1069] ." Finally, and perhaps more importantly , reliance on psycho-
metric models for test bias without consideration of the social and ethical conse-
quences of test use ignores the concerns of significant segments of society . 
Although the American Psychological Association Ad Hoc Committee Report on 
the Educational Uses of Tests with Disadvantaged Students (Cleary et aI. , 1975) 
defended the technical adequacy of tests for prediction and selection, it failed to 
consider what minority groups charge was the egregious misuse of tests having a 
negative impact on the lives of minorities (Bernal, 1975; Jackson, 1975) . As 
Reschly (1979) points out: " to defend tests on the basis of evidence of common 
regression systems or to attempt to separate the issues of technical adequacy from 
the social consequences is insufficient [po 235]." In that light, recent attempts to 
examine the ethical, legal, and socia l implications of various models of test bias 
are valuable additions to the literature (Cole, 1981 ; Hunter & Schmidt, 1976; 
Messick , 1980; Novick & Ellis, 1977; Reynolds, 1982) . In essence, even the 
selection of a model to measure and ameliorate test bias is ultimately a value 
judgment (Kaplan, 1982). 
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 
My complaints about the Supreme Court should not deflect responsibility from 
psychologists. I think it may be legitimate to place at least part of the fau lt for the 
current and continuing confusion concern ing tests on psychologists themselves. 
One of the more intriguing aspects of Judge Grady's decision in PASE v. Hannon 
106 BERSOFF 
(1980) was his almost utter rejection of the testimony of expert psychologists 
who testified either for the black children challenging the IQ tests or for the 
school system seeking to defend them . In a quote that I think deserves some 
thought he said: 
None of the witnesses in this case has so impressed me with his or her credibility or 
expertise that I would feel secure in basing a decision simply on his or her opinion. 
In some instances, I am satisfied that the opinions expressed are more the result of 
doctrinaire commitment to a preconceived idea than they are the result of scientific 
inquiry . I need something more than the conc lusions of witnesses in order to arrive 
at my own conclusion [p. 836). 
Several years ago Cronbach (1975) warned psychologists involved in testing 
issues not to be advocates. But , far too often they have testified/or one side or 
the other. Although psychologists perform a valuable service when they testify as 
expert witnesses , they should be aware that their data , interpretations , and opin-
ions will be tested in the crucible of courtroom cross-examination whose very 
purpose is to destroy credibility and evoke evidence of bias on the part of the 
expert. Whereas the distillation of that process may yield testimony of great 
consequence and weight to the court, it can be highly anxiety provoking for the 
psychologist who acts as an injudicious advocate pleading for a position rather 
than as a cautious, neutral scientist presenting data in an even-handed manner. 
Recently, concerned psychologists have indicated the many ways social sci-
entists can influence public policy effectively (Bersoff, 1983; DeLeon, 0 ' Keefe, 
Vandenbos , & Kraut, 1982; Horowitz & Katz, 1975; Loftus & Monahan , 1980; 
Saks, 1978) . Within the bounds of scientific and professional ethics, that is an 
important, if not crucial, role. But, if psychologists are to be respected by the 
courts and treated as more than mere numerologists attempting to convince the 
judiciary of doctrinaire positions, they must offer more situation-specific, eco-
logically valid, objective data that serve science, not a particular adversary. In 
that way , perhaps , courts may finally arrive at not only judically sound but 
psychometrically justified decisions that will withstand both appellate and scien-
tific scrutiny. 
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